



U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections

Washington, DC 20534

August 28, 2008

Mr. Theodis Beck, Secretary  
North Carolina Department of Corrections  
214 West Jones Street  
4201 Mail Service Center  
Raleigh, NC 27699

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SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dear Secretary Beck:

Pursuant to our meeting last week to review draft Technical Assistance Report #08C1025, please find enclosed the final report. As a follow-up, I have summarized below the recommended "next steps" should you request any additional technical assistance in the future.

Short-term recommendations:

- Develop a pre-screening instrument that will identify and screen out high-risk offenders who are assigned to the lowest level of community supervision. This will assist with assuring resources are concentrated on developing case management strategies for offenders most at risk.
- Conduct Transformational Leadership training for mid-managers to provide them with skill sets to assist with leading "change" movements within the organization, and provide mentoring/coaching support for staff they supervise. This training will develop "critical thinkers" who are vital to handling leadership challenges.

Mid-Term recommendations:

- Conduct a comprehensive workload and staffing analysis to improve discrepancies in recruitment, hiring, training and equalization of caseload assignments.
- Develop and implement policy strategies for intake, transfers and violations to include a technology infrastructure for interfacing with the critical thinkers involved in decision-making.


Long-Term recommendations:

- Develop a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, with strong representation from all stakeholders to establish, guide and communicate effective criminal justice principles and practices across the board. Said Council should be chaired by a senior North Carolina statesman to build advisory capacity and credibility to the Council for unity and influential impact on issues pertaining to criminal justice.

- Retain the services of an expert consultant specializing in organizational development and management to assist the Department with developing a meaningful and achievable strategic plan for the future (3-5 year plan).

I wish you the best and look forward to the opportunity to work with the North Carolina Department of Corrections again in the near future. Please let us know if NIC can be of service to you again.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Morris Thigpen". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "M" and "T".

Morris Thigpen, Director  
National Institute of Corrections

**STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA**

**DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS**

**DIVISION OF COMMUNITY  
CORRECTIONS**

**Technical Assistance Request  
08C1025**

**July 1, 2008**

**Prepared by:**

**Thomas H. Williams  
Cathy Waller-Borovac**

**National Institute of Corrections**

**Technical Assistance**

**No. 08C1025**

**DISCLAIMER**

This technical assistance activity was funded by the Community Corrections Division of the National Institute of Corrections. The Institute is a Federal agency established to provide assistance to strengthen state and local correctional agencies by creating more effective, humane, safe and just correctional services.

Thomas H. Williams, the resource person who provided the onsite technical assistance, did so through a cooperative agreement, at the request of the North Carolina Department of Corrections, and through the coordination of the National Institute of Corrections. Cathy Waller-Borovac was the second resource person who provided onsite technical assistance to the project. Her services were provided on a contractual basis, at the request of the North Carolina Department of Corrections, and through the coordination of the National Institute of Corrections. The direct onsite assistance and the subsequent report are intended to assist the agency in addressing issues outlined in the original request and in efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the agency.

The content of this document reflects the views of Thomas H. Williams and Cathy Waller-Borovac. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official views of the National Institute of Corrections.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Mr. Theodis Beck, the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC), contacted Mr. Morris Thigpen, Director of the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), to request technical assistance in reviewing certain aspects of the Division of Community Corrections' (DCC's) operations. The request was initiated in response to two probation offenders under supervision to the DCC who were arrested and charged with murder.

Specifically, Secretary Beck requested that the review include:

1. An independent evaluation of DCC's policies, procedures, and case management practices for offenders assigned to its large metropolitan urban areas;
2. An evaluation of current staffing levels in large metropolitan urban areas; and,
3. Recommendations for ensuring adequate staff coverage and appropriate staff training for urban districts that have historically experienced high staff turnover rates.

To perform the review, Secretary Beck and NIC selected two Reviewers with a broad and extensive background in community corrections to conduct the review and develop the technical assistance report. The Reviewers reviewed existing Agency policies and procedures, data provided by the Central Administration Office, and an updated Training Manual. In addition, the Reviewers conducted on-site interviews with a broad, representative cross section of staff representing all Agency units and divisions, as well as criminal justice stakeholders.

The review focused on three areas: 1) an operational review, which focused on intake and supervision/case management; 2) management oversight, which focused on hiring, salary, new academy training, audits and case reviews, and performance evaluation/corrective action; and 3) technology, which focused on the current information system and reporting capability.

With respect to the failings in the two cases generating the technical assistance request, the Reviewers determined that the primary issue was that the line staff failed to execute Agency policy, coupled with ineffective management oversight at each level in the DCC. The Reviewers also identified that the Agency's lack of technology and information sharing impacts DCC's ability to track high risk offenders when they break the law and commit new offenses. This lack of technology and communication impedes the receipt of timely information by the staff when an offender is arrested on a probation warrant and is permitted to bail out. Other problem areas identified in the review included: intake, high caseloads, uncertainty regarding evidence-based practices initiative and work volume, vacant caseloads, offender assessment processing, appropriate level of supervision, training for new Probation and Parole Officers (PPOs), information system confidentiality issues, interagency communication and rearrests, and Pre-Sentence Investigations (PSIs). Based on the review, the Reviewers developed 18 recommendations to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency and 17 recommendations to address management and personnel issues.

Finally, the Reviewers found that the DCC is being operated by a cadre of dedicated community corrections professionals who are committed to providing quality services with the maximum protection afforded to the public. The State of North Carolina is fortunate to have such dedicated public servants.

## INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 2008, the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC), Mr. Theodis Beck, wrote to Mr. Morris Thigpen, Director of the National Institute of Corrections (NIC). Secretary Beck requested technical assistance from NIC “to assist in helping the Department evaluate its community corrections programs and initiatives for offenders placed on probation, post-release supervision or parole” [sic]. Two recent events were of concern to the Secretary, as these two events called into question the effectiveness of the Division of Community Correction’s (DCC) efforts directed toward the management and control of offenders assigned for supervision in two of the State’s largest metropolitan urban areas. Specifically, the Secretary requested:

1. An independent evaluation of DCC’s policies, procedures, and case management practices for offenders assigned to its large metropolitan urban areas;
2. An evaluation of current staffing levels in large metropolitan urban areas; and,
3. Recommendations for ensuring adequate staff coverage and appropriate staff training for urban districts that have historically experienced high staff turnover rates.

The request was initiated in response to two probation offenders under supervision to the DCC who were arrested and charged with murder. Offender Demario Atwater, age 21, was arrested on March 11, 2008 for the murder of Ms. Eve Carson. Ms. Carson was the student president for the University of North Carolina. The offense occurred in Orange County on March 5, 2008. Offender Atwater was assigned for supervision in Judicial District #10, Wake County. The second offender, Offender Laurence Lovett, age 17 was assigned for supervision in Judicial District #14, Durham County. He is the co-defendant with Offender Atwater in the Carson murder. In addition, Offender Lovette also is in custody charged with the murder of a Duke University graduate student, Mr. Abhijit Mahato. Mr. Mahato was found in his apartment on January 19, 2008.

While under supervision and prior to the arrest for the murders, both offenders were arrested and charged with several offenses, and there are indications that Agency policy was not followed by the supervision staff with regards to the offenders’ supervision requirements. As a result of these two incidents, the Director of the DCC, Mr. Robert Guy, ordered a case investigation by two independent contractors. The investigation began on March 17, 2008, and a final investigative report was delivered to Director Guy on March 29, 2008.

With respect to the Atwater case, a review of the investigative report reveals that there were at least ten case management reviews for auditing or transfer purposes by the Judicial District Manager (JDM) or the Chief Parole & Probation Officer (CPPO) of the Atwater case prior to the offender being apprehended for probation violation by the Parole and Probation Officer (PPO). In addition, the report reveals supervision failings in the Atwater case, as the officer did not supervise the case in accordance with Agency policies, and the PPO did not follow the CPPO’s instructions on April 13, 2007 to locate the offender’s whereabouts as directed.

The PPO for Offender Atwater was made aware of the felony conviction for the offender's first subsequent re-arrest (June 28, 2007, Felon in Possession of Firearm), but the PPO did not swiftly act to notify the Court, nor did the PPO prepare the violation probation warrant for the new conviction. As a result, a third arrest occurred on November 7, 2007. Five months after the felony conviction, the PPO prepared the probation violation warrant. Eight months after the offender's conviction, the PPO arrested Offender Atwater for the probation violations. However, the offender, who had incurred three subsequent re-arrests since being granted probation and one conviction, bonded out on the probation violation charge. The offender appeared in Court as scheduled in early March 2008 to answer for the probation violations. However, due to an error in docketing by the Court Clerk's office (case was not on the docket for the Judge), the offender's case was rescheduled for a probation violation hearing at the end of the month. Ms. Carson was murdered eight days later.

With respect to the Offender Lovette case, a newly appointed PPO was assigned the case for supervision. The PPO was not certified as a PPO. She had been hired in August 2007 and was scheduled for the New Officer's Training Academy in March 2008. In the course of the investigation, the investigators noted several late entries by the PPO into the Agency's information system. These late entries by the PPO are contrary to Agency policy with respect to the timely entry of offender contacts in the Agency's information system.

Two months after Offender Lovette was granted probation, he was arrested for the murders of Ms. Carson and Mr. Mahato. Prior to the arrest for the murders, Offender Lovette was arrested on two other occasions, two days apart, on two separate felony charges, Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle (February 2, 2008) and Misdemeanor Resisting Arrest; and, Felony Larceny and Felony Larceny after Breaking and Entering (February 4, 2008). The PPO did not make any face-to-face contacts with the offender during his short tenure under supervision, and the PPO did not complete required case management activities by Agency policy within the first 30 days of supervision. This case was assigned at sentencing to community punishment. However, given the offender's instant offense, coupled with the offender's risk and needs factors, in hindsight, a higher level of supervision appears to have been warranted. There are varying opinions among the DCC staff whether community punishment offenders assigned by the Court and later determined to be high risk can be administratively moved to the intermediate punishment level of supervision. In addition, staff did not have access to this offender's juvenile records, which currently are sealed. Access to this information would have had a potential impact on the offender's initial risk assessment.

As a result of the supervision failings in these two cases and the nature of the alleged offenses committed by these two offenders, there has been constant media attention regarding the management oversight responsibilities and supervision practices of the DCC. Moreover, the morale of the staff has been negatively affected, as there are many individuals in the DCC who are extremely dedicated state employees, providing excellent service to the citizens of the State of North Carolina.

In an attempt to address the concerns raised by the Secretary, a two and half day site visit was scheduled by the National Institute Corrections (NIC) reviewers. A total of nine sessions were held with both internal (DCC) staff and external stakeholders (Wake County Criminal Justice Officials). A total of 87 individuals participated in the interview sessions. A cross section of DCC personnel from geographical locations around the state—urban, suburban, and rural

locations—participated in the interview sessions. A cross section of the DCC staff, including line workers, supervisors, managers, senior operational staff at the division level, as well as staff positions assigned to DCC Central Administration, were included in the interview sessions. At the conclusion of the interviews, a debriefing was conducted with the Senior Administrator for DCC.

The discussions were frank and the participants were willing to share their views on a variety of topics that were presented to the various groups by the Reviewers. The external stakeholders acknowledged that an increased level of cooperation and coordination would improve criminal justice services in the area. In addition, it was recognized that the criminal justice system at Wake County is hindered in the delivery of efficient and effective services to the citizens, partners, and offenders it serves due to a lack of communication and automation. A Criminal Justice Coordinating Council also would aide the partners in furthering criminal justice goals for the County. The State of North Carolina restructured its sentencing and probation statutes in 1994. The enabling statutes dictate the sentences for criminal defendants. The Office of the District's Attorney is the responsible entity for advising the Court at disposition of the criminal history of the defendants. However, there appears to be little interest in pursuing the inclusion of a Pre-Sentence Investigative (PSI) document to aid the judiciary in its decision making process. Although there was acknowledgement that this document would have utility for both the Court and the DCC, court case volume and judges rotating to various jurisdictions were reasons given as to why the PSI process could not be included in the Court disposition process. A very strong willingness does exist for the external stakeholders to meet to address strategic criminal justice planning for the area. However, without a funding source or leadership, the prognosis is guarded that a formalized structure will be instituted or sustained. **The Reviewers recommend that a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council be established to ensure that a forum exists for stakeholders to meet regularly to discuss and plan criminal issues.**

The DCC staff was found to be familiar with and committed to the Division's published mission and goals. Several of the more tenured staff articulated a change in philosophy, with the focus of Community Corrections moving from "treatment to control." DCC has been aggressive in its planning to move the agency in the Evidence-Based Practices (EBP) philosophy and to establish a more balanced approach to community supervision, focusing on the importance of assessment (risk and needs) to drive the case management process, coupled with case planning and supervision strategies that emphasize the quality of supervision contacts, versus the quantity. Whereas it seems that the senior operational staff understood the rationale and need for this philosophical shift, the supervisors and the line staff may not be able to embrace fully this philosophical change, as the volume of cases, PPOs involved in collateral functions not directly related to offender services, and other operational constraints may restrict the EBP goals of central administration.

Large spans of control at the line through executive levels, high turnover in critical positions in the field, cumbersome and elongated recruitment/hiring practices, protracted periods for new officers training, training division staff extremely slow to update training curriculum consistent with changes in field operations, caseloads exceeding the recommended statutory limits, ineffective employee corrective action practices, and the inefficient, cumbersome data base management system may severely impact the goals and performance targets established by central administration. Unfortunately, several of these challenges directly attributed to the DCC being ineffective in the management and control of the two cases previously mentioned. The



**Reviewers recommend a concentrated focus on the fundamentals of effective assessment, case planning, intervention strategies and supervision so that the Agency can be assured that cases are managed in a manner consistent with Executive staff expectations.**

## **I. Operational Reviews**

The operational reviews focused on two areas:

- A. Intake, and
- B. Supervision/Case Management.

### **A. Intake**

The Reviewers visited the Wake County Intake Office. The supervisor for the intake office advised that she supervised a total of 22 staff: nine (9) community service workers, three (3) lead community coordinators, six Parole and Probation Officers I (PPO 1), one (1) Surveillance Officer, two (2) data entry clerks, and one (1) Office Assistant. The intake office is located in a building that houses both Superior and District Court functions. It is estimated that a total of 25-30 intakes a day are processed to include intakes that could not be processed and entered into the information system the previous day. On average, it takes 30 minutes to complete the intake process per offender. The unit is housed in the same building as the Courts and serves both the District and Superior courts.

Staff is required to escort the offenders from the courtroom to the intake office. Although the Community Service Coordinating (CSC) staff primarily has this responsibility at Wake County Intake Office, in other locations around the State, the escort function is assigned to the PPO staff. It also was reported that, in other court jurisdictions, the PPOs must wait in court for the case disposition. If probation is granted to the offender, the PPO is responsible for assisting in completing the probation document and then escorting the offender to the parole and probation office to complete the intake process.

It appears that there is not a formalized training program for the staff assigned to the intake function at Wake County. Primarily, the newly appointed staff acquires the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the intake tasks via on the job training, primarily through shadowing a seasoned employee. A training guide is provided to new staff; however, the training guide is currently being updated, and the CPPO is awaiting middle management approval on the manual modifications.

As part of the operational review, the training guide was reviewed. **The Reviewers recommend that the guide be revised to: include an introduction section, mission and goal statements; be specific with respect to specific time period to accomplish the components of the intake process and the responsible parties; identify what documents are required to complete the intake process; define the process to be employed when the probation order is in error or the Judge's instructions appeared to be unclear; specify the time period within which to correct the order; and identify who is the responsible party to initiate the action to correct the probation order, etc.** The guide or manual should clearly delineate the intake tasks, responsible persons, the time parameters to accomplish the tasks, and what constitutes the completed intake process. The major topics, sections and subsections of the guide/manual also

should be formatted for ease of identification to the reader. **It is recommended that central administration staff take responsibility for revising the guide/manual and determine its applicability to other intake units state-wide.**

At the Wake County Intake Office, the PPO has the responsibility of reviewing the court orders with the offenders and obtaining a signature from the offender acknowledging his/her understanding of the conditions of release. Errors in the court release document are the responsibility of the PPOs to correct. Court order error issues are, at times, brought to the attention of the supervisor, who provides direction to the PPOs; or, depending on the nature of the error, the PPO will take responsibility to seek out the designated court official to have the probation order corrected. This corrective action process can be cumbersome. It appears that the clerk who made the probation order must be approached to correct the problem. A revised order is needed and requires the Judge's signature. The Judge may question the need for the revision, thus causing additional delays in the processing of the order. An error in the court order in the Atwater case was not corrected and, given the cumbersome process to correct a court order, it is understandable, albeit, not acceptable for errors in probation orders to go unresolved.

When an out of County intake is processed, and the receiving PPO is unable to locate the listed home address for the offender, these cases are forwarded back to the intake office for resolution. Typically, the PPOs assigned to the intake office are tasked with the responsibility of locating the offender. If the offender cannot be located, the case is prepared for a violation, with the offender classified as an absconder. This process is inefficient and potentially a risk to public safety. Once the case is assigned to the field, the field PPO should have the responsibility for locating the offender and if required, preparing the absconder warrant. If case miss-assignment is a major issue, data can be collected by the Judicial Divisional Manager who has oversight over the intake offices for review. Moreover, intake officers calling the resident owner of the home where the offender is scheduled to live also could reduce the likelihood of miss-assignment of cases.

The supervisor of the intake office stated that she does not receive management reports that provide basic information to her regarding her operations (i.e., number of intakes processed daily, weekly, or monthly; average time to enter intakes; number of intakes that had to be entered the day after court; etc.). These basic data reports would assist middle/upper management, as well as the supervisor, in establishing benchmarks for the intake process, determining if staff is meeting DCC's goals for intake processing, and ascertaining if the intake function is sufficiently staffed. Lacking data, it is not possible to determine if the staffing level is appropriate at this time for the intake function. The Reviewers' observations are that a redesign of the office layout also would improve operational efficiency of the intake process. An office redesign, in which the offender enters the intake office, has his/her picture taken prior to sitting with the intake worker for processing, and then exits the office through a door other than the main entry door, would decrease the disruptive influences of the offenders constantly flowing back and forth in the work area and would improve intake processing.

Lastly, there does not appear to be a process in place for the DCC to be assured that all probation grants the day before were received for intake processing. In meetings with the Court Clerk at Wake County, she acknowledged that her office prepares no data reports for transmission to the parole and probation officials. Management information reports, that list by name and court docket number the number of probation grants or split sentence cases that were processed in Court the day before, would assist the DCC in determining that all cases in which a probation

grant was ordered were received and processed for assignment. It is assumed that, since the PPOs or other DCC staff are escorting offenders to the intake office or, when required, interviewing offenders in the lock-up prior to transportation to jail, all offenders with a supervision responsibility are interviewed and entered into the DCC's information system. A back-up system needs to be instituted so that the DCC is assured that all cases requiring community supervision are presented to the DCC for intake processing.

## **B. Supervision/Case Management**

In the Atwater and Lovette cases, severe supervision and case management deficiencies were noted. With respect to the Atwater cases, the one major theme was the length of time in which there were no positive face-to-face contacts between the offender and DCC personnel. A similar theme of no positive face-to-face contacts was noted in the Lovette case. DCC policy is clear with respect to the PPO's responsibilities in this area. A failure to execute face-to-face contacts by the PPO is the central issue. However, aside from the management failings with respect to these two cases, other issues emerged during the Reviewers' discussions with staff:

1. Blended caseloads and high caseloads;
2. Uncertainty regarding evidence-based practices initiative and work volume;
3. Vacant caseloads, with no one assuming supervision responsibility;
4. Offender assessment processing;
5. Appropriate supervision levels;
6. Training for new PPOs;
7. Information system problems;
8. Interagency communication and rearrests; and
9. PSIs.

### **1. Blended caseloads and high caseloads.**

Caseloads for newly appointed and tenured field officers were reported to range from 90-140 offenders per PPO, with the average being approximately 110 offenders per PPO. Specialized caseloads (sex offenders and domestic violence offenders) average approximately 30 offenders per officer. The Agency has provided authorization for certain regions to blend cases. The blending concept involves either having staff supervise a mixed caseload of both community and intermediate punishment offenders, or designating PPOs responsible for the supervision of intermediate punishment cases with varying supervision levels. Several districts reported success with the blended caseload practice, reporting a reduction in vacant positions and an equalization of caseloads. In one jurisdiction, the Area Administrator received permission to convert the PPO I position and hire at the PPO II level, thus facilitating the blending concept. **It is recommended that the Agency continue its efforts in blending the caseloads statewide where feasible; particularly the blending of community and intermediate punishment level cases.**

### **2. Uncertainty regarding evidence-based practices initiative and work volume.**

Staff was found to be familiar with and committed to the Division's published mission and goals. The mission and goals of the Agency resonated with the staff, and many expressed how proud they were to work for the Agency. Overall, the majority of the staff expressed a strong sense of offender accountability with a balance being sought in the management of the offenders between the risks to public safety and/or brokering, or referring offenders for programmatic services as a

means to further reduce the offenders' public safety risk. However, there is an undercurrent of feelings that some staff in the DCC has not bought into the balanced approach to supervision and is clearly at the law enforcement end of the spectrum.

Several of the more tenured staff and some recently appointed staff articulated the need for a change in philosophy, with the focus of Community Corrections moving from "treatment to control", as a response to the continuing increase in the volume of cases under supervision (i.e., high case volume will dictate counting contacts as a means of officer's survival in the event that the case "goes bad."). Although these barriers are not impossible to overcome, these issues will have to be addressed by senior and executive staff if the DCC's Evidence-based Practices (EBPs) is to take a strong foothold. It appears that the groups less likely to be in favor of the EBPs initiative are the CPPOs and the PPOs. Both of these groups have a strong desire to be agents of change with the supervisors wanting to provide the guidance, direction, and instructions necessary to improve the technical skills of their direct reports; however, work volume is impeding the desire to achieve at a higher level. As many supervisors reported, they are barely able to keep up with the currently activities and functions of their current position, and they expressed concern that they may not have the time to learn and implement a new system.

### 3. Vacant caseloads.

There is an inconsistent policy or guidance on how CPPOs and JDMs handle vacant caseloads. As the vacant caseload was a central theme in the Atwater case, **the Reviewers recommend that a single policy on this issue be developed and promulgated to staff.** The subject of courtesy supervision/vacant caseloads also was a point of controversy throughout the site visit. High staff turnover and extended times for filling vacant positions have created a need to have caseloads supervised during interim periods. In some instances, the cases are divided up, with Surveillance Officers and high performing PPOs usually being assigned the bulk of the cases, thus creating increased caseloads and responsibilities. This contributes to staff feeling like they are being punished for doing a good job, while substandard PPOs are rewarded by not having to assume additional cases. In addition, veteran officers, who carry smaller specialized caseloads, generally are not assigned "routine" vacant caseload supervision responsibilities. Vacant cases require the same number of PPO contacts commensurate with the assigned supervision level, so in order to keep from adding to line officers' already taxed caseload numbers, some CPPOs are personally assuming the supervision of officer vacant cases. The CPPOs informed the Reviewers that the various administrative tasks associated with their function leave little time for one-on-one guidance, instructions, and follow-up with the PPOs. It was reported that some CPPOs leave a vacant caseload(s) intact, and when the offender reports, a unit member will conduct the interview. Adding to the problems with vacant caseloads is the fact that extended vacancies create the opportunity for these types of cases, when transferred, to be transferred multiple times to PPOs, increasing the possibility that these cases fall through the cracks, and these offenders will not be held accountable to their probation orders and conditions. This then becomes a public risk factor and brings the Division's credibility into question.

**It is recommended that vacant caseloads be distributed among the PPOs in the office.** PPOs need to be identified with responsibility for the supervision of these offenders. Whereas the assignment of the vacant caseload to the rest of the PPOs will increase the workload of the staff, **management also should develop a mitigation policy that clearly defines what will be the expectations for staff once their caseloads exceed the DCC's standard.** It is highly

commendable that CPPOs would take on the day-to-day supervision of vacant caseloads, but day-to-day offender supervision is not the role or function of the CPPOs.

4. Offender assessment processing.

The Offender Trait Inventory (OTI) is the Agency's primary risk instrument. A recently developed web-based risk and needs instrument is currently being piloted in several districts of the State, and a validation study for the instrument is planned. The OTI was designed as a tool to assist officers with case planning, but this function is impeded due to the inability to initially determine realistic offender risk and needs. Case plans are, in essence, now formulated based on the order of the releasing authority. The newly designed instrument will take longer to administer than the former risk instrument, but the case assessment benefits should outweigh the time investment by the staff.

5. Appropriate level of supervision.

Another area that will require policy consideration is inappropriate assignments of cases to the community punishment level of supervision. Offender Lovette is an example. This offender was assigned to the community punishment level of supervision. However, his presenting supervision issues required a high level of DCC's attention. Although the Courts have the authority for initial supervision placement (community or intermediate punishment), **DCC should develop a screening instrument with a limited number of items that can identify and screen out high risk offenders who are assigned to the lowest level of community supervision. Once these cases have been identified, policy is needed to move these cases to the intermediate punishment level within a certain time period.**

In determining an offender's initial risk and appropriate level of supervision (particularly juvenile offenders), it is important that DCC staff have access to an offender's existing juvenile records, if applicable. Current legislation prohibits DCC staff from having access to juvenile records, which currently are sealed. **The Reviewers recommend that DOC seek legislation to address this discrepancy so that DCC staff can access relevant information on offenders assigned to supervision and have a complete picture of the offender's current and prior criminal history when determining the appropriate supervision level.**

Also during the staff discussions, no one could articulate a policy that would effectively reassign a high risk/high needs offender from community punishment to intermediate punishment, or vice versa. Some staff expressed the view that the DCC does not have the authority to make the change without judicial authorization, while others indicated that, under delegated authority, the DCC could, in fact, move a case from community to intermediate punishment. The statute provides for delegated authority to the DCC to increase the offender's frequency of contacts, referral for substance abuse assessment and treatment, and assignment of up to 20 hours of community service. Clarification via guidance to staff is required so that all staff executes the policy uniformly. A short screening tool would serve the purpose of identifying inappropriately assigned cases, which would be better served in the intermediate punishment level of supervision.

Improper supervision levels also occur when the Court utilizes probation services for collection of high restitution or other fees, or to enforce lesser infractions, such as violation of helmet laws. In these cases, there is no current mechanism in place to mitigate supervision for these

administrative cases, so more officer time is spent in collection of money, than in field supervision and effective case planning for higher risk offenders.

#### 6. Training for new PPOs.

As noted in the Lovette case, a newly appointed PPO was assigned Offender Lovette's case for supervision. Generally, it was reported to the Reviewers that newly appointed PPOs are paired with a tenured employee. This practice appears to be problematic on two counts. Both CPPOs and PPOs indicated that they have little time for training of new staff. The CPPOs indicated that they wished that they had more time to provide the training for new staff, but the administrative demands of their position requires nearly all of their attention. The PPOs expressed the view that high caseloads and the attendant responsibilities for the high caseloads distracts from their ability to give quality time to new recruits. This dilemma for the DCC has a negative impact on new employees and may be a contributing factor to the high turnover rate in certain offices. From the discussions with DCC personnel, it is unclear what tasks are to be assigned to newly appointed PPOs. **It is recommended that the DCC develop a policy that is instructive to its managers of the types of tasks and responsibilities appropriate for newly appointed PPOs.** In addition, the CPPOs have to take lead responsibility for training of new staff. **It also is recommended that the newly appointed staff have very limited direct offender supervision responsibilities, and that these newly appointed staff not provide testimony at probation violation hearings.**

#### 7. Information system problems.

Unfortunately for both management and line workers, the staff operates out of two information systems. The OTI, as well as the bulk of the supervision data collection and offender case supervision efforts, are maintained in a mainframe system. This system is built on a complex relational database platform; however, the Offender Population Unified System (OPUS), the Agency's information system, is the source of constant staff complaints: cumbersome to navigate through the various supervision screens, diminished speed in operations, and a layout design that is not user-friendly. All of these factors decrease operational efficiency for the staff utilizing the system.

#### 8. Interagency communication and rearrests.

Atwater was permitted to bail out even after committing subsequent felony offenses while under supervision. If the releasing authority had been in possession of the offender's supervision history, most likely it would have made a difference in his release status. Similarly, it was reported that offenders arrested on probation warrants often are permitted to bail out, and the assigned officer is not made aware of the offender's arrest until after the service of the warrant and the non-compliant offender's release back to the community. **The Department should seek legislation that would mandate the arresting authority to contact the DCC to ascertain if the offender is known to the parole and probation system. If so, the DCC would have a designated time period in which to contact the appropriate judicial officer to hold the offender in custody without bail until the probation violation hearing is scheduled.** The criminal justice community has to weigh the potential public safety impact of permitting high risk felons to return to the community once arrested or apprehended.

9. PSIs. In meeting with the Agency's stakeholders in Wake County, the topic of PSIs was discussed. There is stakeholder resistance for the DCC to prepare and present to the Court PSIs for convicted felony offenders prior to sentencing. The general opinion is that waiting for PSIs will increase the disposition proceedings and, to reschedule an offender's disposition hearing to wait for the PSI, will negatively impact the Court's docket. The District Prosecutor is responsible for advising the Court of the defendant's criminal history. Recent arrests in another jurisdiction may occur, and the prosecutor would not have the information at sentencing; thus, the Court is not always informed of the complete arrest and conviction history of the criminal defendant at the time of sentencing and there is no assessment for risk to reoffend.

There are many advantages to the PSI, in addition to assisting the Court with its disposition decision. The Agency could use the document to assist with the risk and needs assessment and to review and plan the strategies for supervising the offender, based on the verifiable information contained in the PSI. The review of collateral contact information of persons also may be an aid to the PPO in supervising the offender's case. If the offender is sentenced to a term of incarceration, the PSI would aid the DOC staff in its classification processing of the inmate, and future case management/reentry plans could be developed utilizing the information in the PSI. Plus, the PSI could be used to identify potential security risks to the institution with regards to inmate visitation, housing, etc. The utility of the PSI document is immeasurable as a tool for the DCC to minimize its risk of the offenders whom the Agency is charged to supervise.

## **II. Management Oversight**

A review of management oversight responsibilities focused on the five following areas:

- A. Hiring,
- B. Salary,
- C. New Academy Training,
- D. Audits and Case Reviews, and
- E. Performance Evaluation/Corrective Action

### **A. Hiring Delays**

A consistent theme throughout the discussion with staff was the delays in the hiring process. It was not uncommon to hear that the hiring process takes 5–6 months from posting to hiring. This issue is within the control of management, as the DOC hiring process is controlled internally by the DOC, abiding by the personnel policies and procedures established by the Office of State Personnel. A solution is sorely needed as staff morale is severely impacted by long delays in replacing staff, who leave the Agency.

The hiring process, based on Merit System rules, emphasizes experience, as opposed to education and other specialized skills sets, such as interpreter skills. As such, it was reported that many criminal justice college interns and college graduates are screened out of the best qualified list in favor of staff transferring out of the prison system. This was viewed as contrary to a "helping" concept of community corrections. **The Reviewers recommend that the core competencies hiring criteria be revised to identify those skill sets and abilities beyond**

**compliance monitoring, (for example: action planning, motivating for change, dealing with resistant offenders, leveraging resources for mentally ill offenders, etc.) that are consistent with evidence-based practices.**

Each Area Administrator office has a personnel specialist whose primary task is recruitment. It appears that refresher training on merit system rules could improve the hiring process and expand the pool of eligible candidates for selection. **Moreover, it is further recommended that the positions for PPO be advertised on an open and continuous basis.** This practice would ensure that a pool of applicants would be readily available for selection for hiring. Lastly, the process for hiring also could be improved with better coordination between the personnel function at the department level and the Area Administrator levels. **The Reviewers recommend that meetings be held between the two divisions to resolve outstanding issues and concerns.**

## **B. Salary**

Starting salaries for the PPO I position is reported to be approximately \$31,000; some staff indicated that the salary is well below the national average for these positions and is less than law enforcement positions within the State. One issue is the fact that when the position is advertised, the minimum salary is posted as \$31,000; yet the starting salary is actually commensurate with a "training progression" described in smaller print on the job posting, resulting in a training salary that is less than the posted salary of \$31,000. This difference in pay was attributed to a mandatory twelve month certification process. In addition, urban staff is paid the same starting salary as rural staff, with urban staff not having an allowance for costly parking, which is required for officers assigned to daily or weekly court duty. Another factor contributing to poor staff morale is that there have been no merit increases in previous years, a new hire will make more in salary than a tenured PPO. The low salary also is reported as a major factor in many staff obtaining secondary jobs to supplement their salary. Not only PPOs, but management personnel, as well, are reported to have secondary positions. Low salaries also are a contributing factor in the turnover rate, as staff is seeking other State positions that have a higher starting salary. A few staff indicated that they are not compensated in pay or time for working beyond an 8 hour day/40 hour work week.

## **C. New Academy Training**

The Lovette case illustrates the problem of non-certified PPOs having direct offender supervision responsibilities. As previously stated, all probation officers currently must be certified within 12 months of hire, which is an excessively long time for a PPO to become certified. Also, due to the extended vacancies and tedious hiring process, it is common for newly hired officers to receive caseloads to supervise on their first day on the job without being certified or having gone to the new officers training academy. Staff also stated that it could take up to five months for PPOs to even get to the new officers training academy after they already have been supervising a full caseload. In addition, it appears that the new officers training academy is not even scheduled to be held until there is a class of 20-30 recently appointed PPOs. The CPPOs also reported that they have little time to be the primary trainer for newly assigned staff.

Another grave concern of the DCC staff is that the new officers training academy is conducted by the Department's Office of Staff Development and Training. The training is sanctioned by



the Criminal Justice Training and Standards Commission, which approves the training curriculum; however the Commission only meets quarterly, so DCC policy revisions and the training modules are not current. Thus, new hires may be trained on information that is not relevant to the job. Staff was quite vocal that the new hires are not adequately trained to perform the tasks of PPO, based on the training at the new officer's academy.

It also was reported that the academy instructors are primarily from the Prisons Division, with only five instructors devoted to teach Community Corrections components. This low number of instructors contributes to the lack of in-service training available to supervisors for managerial training on components, such as communication, time management, effective listening, case management, and other areas, such as audits and case reviews.

Finally, the Districts attempt to "re-train" the returning staff, via the use of mentors; however, as noted previously, this process is ineffective. If mentors are to be used in the training process for newly appointed staff, a formalized process needs to be developed, and a cadre of mentors must be trained in the mentoring process. Mentors also must have the time to serve this function without having a negative impact on their primary function.

**To address these concerns, the Reviewers recommend that: 1) the Secretary direct the training division to coordinate the new officers training academy consistent with the needs of DCC; 2) no new PPOs be assigned to a field location or receive a supervision caseload until the trainees first complete the new officers training academy; 3) the front line supervisor be the primary trainer for all staff assigned to the organizational unit; 4) the time it takes for new officers to become certified be reduced; 5) the curricula for the new officer's academy receive expedited review and approval; and 6) a formalized process for mentors be developed.**

#### **D. Audits and Case Reviews**

Audits or case reviews are triggered through the OPUS system on a monthly, random basis. Cases for auditing are identified for review as follows:

1. All new cases 30 days after assignment;
2. One case at random;
3. Cases that have had no face-to-face officer contact;
4. Cases within 120 days of expiration;
5. Cases with prior deficiencies; and
6. Cases with three or more years of supervision.

A 30 day follow-up period has been designated for the staff to correct the deficiencies noted in the case review. The review system becomes so overwhelming that supervisors have little time to devote to training new staff or developing other staff for promotion. Mentoring and coaching is minimal, at best, with line staff feeling they are being evaluated by documentation through the case reviews, rather than actual offender supervision activities. Supervisors articulate that case reviews are necessary; however, they believe the process could be streamlined. The existing auditing system also does not provide effective coding mechanisms that relate to noted deficiencies. The codes are enumerated as: 1 (Ok), 2 (Moderate problems), and 3 (Serious

problems), thereby allowing for inconsistencies in interpretation and, ultimately, in follow-up action. In addition, there are no summary statistical and narrative reports developed that aggregate the total of the individual case reviews for the team, office, or district. An aggregate or summary report would provide information to senior or executive management of how well or poorly the staff is performing and help identify resource needs going unmet. **Given this lack of uniformity in assessing the case compliance via the case review process, it is recommended that the DCC consider additional written guidance for staff.**

The DCC central administration directed that special audits be conducted in Districts 10 and 14 in light of the Atwater and Lovette cases. These case audits were conducted by designated teams, who utilized a different coding system to evaluate case management performance. The Durham audit evaluated 1,400 cases and found 80% of the cases with deficiencies relating to policies and practices with violations, modification orders, and absconder cases. Explanations from staff for the high percentage of non-compliant cases ranged from a lack of training by supervisors conducting the case reviews, non-uniformity in applying standards for cases, and subjectivity in the review process. One other criticism of the review process was that, due to the inability to hold officers accountable for gross case deficiencies, the good officers are punished for being efficient because they are often tasked with cleaning up the cases for the poor performing officers. In addition, as these poor performing officers do not move cases expeditiously, the bulk of the case assignments fall on the higher performing staff in the Agency. In a review of the organizational structure at the DCC Central Administration, Area Administrator, and line levels, it appears that the span of control also may lead to inefficiencies in the execution of operations.

Audits are an important management function. There is some merit to staff concerns and complaints that the high number of cases that are selected for auditing and the length of time it takes to complete an audit (ranging from 15 to 40 minutes) affects staff's ability to perform other tasks. In addition to clarifying the audit instructions, **the Reviewers recommend that DCC reduce the number of cases to be audited and take a combination of initial cases and audit a percentage of cases in the various levels at a designated period(s) of time.**

#### **E. Performance Evaluation/Corrective Action**

Although this section is beyond the scope of the Secretary's request, it is included because it was raised as one of the staff's primary concerns. The issue related to staff's evaluation and corrective action was a re-occurring theme with the operational staff. As such, the concerns of the staff are being reported. The major request is for the DCC to manage both the evaluation and the corrective action processes consistently and uniformly. Inconsistent application is a source of morale concerns for the staff. The Agency's performance evaluation process was described as cumbersome and ineffective in holding employees accountable for poor performance. Staff expressed a general feeling that poor performing staff are not held accountable. In some instances, the CPPO's appear not to be clear on the progressive, corrective action steps required to address non-performing staff, and there was indication that guidance and instructions needed from their supervisors to address poor performers are inconsistent and/or confusing. Given the length of time it takes to bring on new staff, poor performers may not be held to increased

scrutiny. Disciplinary action takes repeated counseling and warnings and, because there is no incentive pay, poor performing staff are paid the same as high performers, thereby creating a morale issue.

Poor performers increase the Agency's risk for outside attention and criticism when established policies and procedures are not followed. Managing poor performers is within management's authority and can be addressed and remedied.

**The Reviewers recommend that a training/coaching session for management staff be provided to assist with uniformity of application in the corrective action process. The DCC should review its corrective action policies and processes, as well as consider the feasibility of delegating certain disciplinary actions at the Judicial Area Administrator level.**

### **III. Technology**

#### **A. Current Information System and Reporting Capability**

The Division currently utilizes a relational database system that has reportedly been in place since 1986. This system does not interface effectively with the Courts or Law Enforcement, and does not provide notification to staff of offender warrants or new arrests. There are no common identifiers between agencies, so violations often go undetected. The system also has no search engine capacity and is not tied into the state's electronic warrant repository system. Reports for staff are limited, and management reacts to reports versus being proactive with reports in identifying cases that need attention or review.

A commitment by executive management at the Department level for a requirements analysis, and subsequent development of a new information system, would be an enormous morale booster for the DCC staff. In addition, an information design that would facilitate the receipt of information and improve communication with the DCC's law enforcement partners and programmatic stakeholders would improve overall operational efficiency. For example, a system design that would download Court information into an intake screen and permit the electronic receipt of an offender's probation order would save staff time from typing redundant data into the DCC's intake screens and improve data quality. In addition, the electronic receipt of the probation order would expedite the transfer of the document to its end users. Law enforcement interfaces would permit automatic, electronic notification to the PPOs and CPPOs for offenders who experience a subsequent arrest or "hit notification." This current lack of electronic information notification is a major problem that was noted in both the Atwater and Lovette cases. If such a system were in place, the possibility exists that notification to the Court of an offender's subsequent arrests could have occurred within days of the "hit notification" being received by the staff.

### **IV. Summary**

In light of two recent high profile incidents that have garnered heightened media attention, the Secretary for the Department of Corrections requested through the National Institute of Correction (NIC) a management review of the Division of Community Corrections (DCC) operations, particularly in urban areas.

As a result, a two and a half day site visit was conducted by the Reviewers, and a cross section of staff at all levels of the Agency were interviewed. The interview participants represented each operational and administrative level of the DCC. Agency policy was found to be sufficient in scope to direct staff in the performance of mission critical functions. Within the first 30 days of supervision, staff is required to perform certain tasks to assist in assessing the risk of offenders and in establishing a plan for supervision. The DCC policy is consistent with the intent of statute Article 82, §15A-1343.2.(b), Special probation rules for persons sentenced under Article 81B. The North Carolina Legislature envisioned that offenders assigned to community and intermediate punishment would have a plan developed by the Department of Corrections to assist offenders in adopting a pro-social lifestyle. DCC policy Number IV, Case Management Expectation & Standards, dated March 1, 2006, provides clear guidance specific to the PPO's responsibilities during the offender's tenure under supervision. The risk level of all offenders is to be completed no later than 60 days after assignment to the staff. Moreover, the DCC has embarked on a revision to its risk assessment process, and the philosophical change is underway in training staff in Evidence-Based Practices (EBPs).

DCC has an audit or case review policy that mandates designated cases be reviewed at specific periods in the life cycle of the assigned case. All newly assigned cases are to be reviewed within 30 days, but no later than 45 days of assignment. The Chief Probation and Parole Officers (CPPO) are the principal management group responsible for case reviews. The second management group responsible for case reviews is the Judicial Divisional Managers (JDMs). Case reviews are essential for management to acknowledging the good work that staff is performing with offenders. Also, the reviews can identify potential problems that need staff attention or can identify systemic problems in the organization that require operational directives.

With respect to the failings in the Atwater and Lovette cases, the primary issue was that the line staff failed to execute Agency policy, coupled with the lack of an institutionalized system of quality assurance at each level in the DCC. Management was in the position to know the organizational challenges and problems that existed could contribute to ineffective performance by the staff.

Staffing is a major concern in the DCC. The inability to bring in new staff without serious delays is affecting the DCC's ability to perform its mission critical functions. Moreover, the spans of control at each level of the organization impede the efficient operations of the DCC. From the DCC central administration office through each level of the chain of command, the span of control requires additional staffing. In addition, PPOs performing collateral functions not directly related to community supervision also negatively impacts the DCC's ability to perform its mission critical functions. Although it is reassuring or convenient for the Court to have a PPO in Court, or perform clerk-like functions, this luxury has a negative impact on the staff's ability to perform their mission critical functions. These court-related administrative duties are a further source of frustration and anxiety for PPOs, who are managing their regular caseload, plus the burden of the vacant caseloads.

The lack of technology and information sharing has an impact on DCC's ability to track high risk offenders when they break the law and commit a new offenses. The lack of technology and

communication impedes the receipt of timely information by the staff when an offender is arrested on a probation warrant and is permitted to bail out. This process is a serious public safety issue that may require legislation to address. Internally, the DCC needs an improved information system to assist with its future EBP's plans. During the interview sessions, the staff was quite vocal in their displeasure of the OPUS. The system is reported to be slow in operations, and management audits using OPUS are extremely time-consuming as well as cumbersome. The information system should have more reports that are readily available for line staff to access and be proactive in the case management activities, as well as accessible to management staff for oversight responsibilities.

The DCC is being operated by a cadre of dedicated community corrections professionals who are committed to providing quality services with the maximum protection afforded to the public. All staff the Reviewers encountered and interacted with were knowledgeable, informative, and willing to assist in any way. They displayed a high level of professional conduct, and it was obvious they are experienced in their craft. The State of North Carolina is fortunate to have such dedicated public servants.

## **V. Recommendations**

Based on a review of existing policies and procedures, data provided by the Central Administrative Office, the updated Training Manual, and the on-site interviews with a cross-representation of Agency staff representing all units and levels of management, the Reviewers would like to provide a number of recommendations for the Department's consideration; however it is felt a critical decision must first be made regarding the adoption and implementation of Evidence-Based Practices (EBP). In order to realize any long-term positive impact on risk reduction and recidivism, it is highly recommended that the internalization and application of the tenets of EBP's occur throughout the agency.

The afore-mentioned recommendations are categorized into two groups:

- A. Operational, and
- B. Management/Personnel.

### **A. Operational**

1. Concentrate on the fundamentals of solid assessment, case planning, intervention strategies, and supervision to accomplish the following:
  - a. Identify and correct problem cases noted from the special audits; and
  - b. Purge caseloads of cases that can be closed or terminated.

This approach would be prudent at this point so that the Agency can be assured that cases are managed in a manner consistent with Executive Staff expectations. Post audits may identify additional training needs for line staff and supervisors.

2. Hire dedicated para-professionals to perform the intake duties and responsibilities.

3. Relieve the PPO positions from the escorting, intake, and other court-related administrative duties specific to the intake function.
4. Provide to the Courts a Directional Information Sheet that the Court Clerks can provide to the offenders upon the offenders being granted probation. The Directional Information Sheet will provide the directions and phone number to the DCC Intake Office.
5. Obtain from the Court Clerks Office a daily listing of the defendants granted probation on the previous day. This listing would be used by intake staff to reconcile the DCC probation intake and ensure that offenders sentenced to probation are assigned to supervision. Investigate if the Court can provide a computer tape to be compared against the DCC's intake data base.
6. Develop a policy or operational instruction that establishes that out of county intake assignments are the responsibility of the receiving PPO to resolve, and not the responsibility of the PPO assigned to the intake office. A reasonable timeframe should also be identified for resolution.
7. Establish and promulgate written guidance to the staff regarding the distribution of vacant caseloads. Determine the specific time period that the vacant caseload is to be redistributed to the staff (i.e., distribute cases if caseload is vacant for 30 days or more).
8. Establish and promulgate a mitigation policy as a relief valve for staff who are assigned cases above the DCC threshold for active cases. The policy should take into consideration extending the time period to accomplish certain case-related tasks and a reduction in contact requirements.
9. Develop a 12-15 months plan to revamp, update, merge and migrate OPUS to a more user-friendly and efficient information system. The design should encompass integration with both internal and external stakeholder systems and have operational and management report functionality and capability for all levels of the organization.
10. Develop a "quick screener" tool to be administered by line officers to identify high risk offenders assigned to the community punishment level of supervision. Low risk offenders similarly should be identified when assigned to the intermediate level of punishment.
11. Establish and promulgate written guidance to staff mandating the movement of inappropriately assigned cases between the community and intermediate levels.
12. Establish and promulgate written guidance to staff instructing what types of work-related activities are appropriate for non-certified PPOs. It is recommended that non-certified PPO not provide direct offender services nor provide direct court testimony at violation hearings.
13. Seek legislation that would allow DCC staff to place a no bail hold on public safety risk felons offenders who are rearrested on a new felony charge or arrested on a violation of probation warrant.

14. Have DCC investigate the feasibility of introducing the PSI report on a trial basis to the Court. If the full PSI is not a viable option, then have the DCC develop a shorter version of the PSI that includes the official and defendant's version of the charge; the defendant's criminal, social, substance abuse, and mental history; the offender's physical health; and the PPOs recommendation to the Court.
15. Develop a revised intake manual for the Wake County Intake Office that has screen shots that illustrate the intake process, identify the documents needed to begin the intake process, shows what constitute a correct intake assignment, how to verify a home address, etc.
16. Have Central Administration staff revise the Wake County intake manual for the purposes of state-wide uniformity in state-wide operations, where applicable.
17. Establish a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council to ensure that a forum exists for stakeholders to meet regularly to discuss and plan criminal issues.
18. DOC seek legislation so that DCC staff can access juvenile history information on offenders assigned to supervision to have a complete picture of the offender's current and prior criminal history when determining the appropriate supervision level.

## **B. Management/Personnel**

1. Institute an "open and continuous" job announcement posting and hiring process to develop a qualified, ready pool of applicants to fill vacant PPO positions.
2. Recommend that the core competencies hiring criteria be revised to identify those core competencies (for example: action planning, motivating for change, dealing with resistant offenders, leveraging resources for mentally ill offenders, etc) required for the job that are consistent with evidence-based practices.
3. Discontinue the practice of assigning new PPOs to the field without having first completed the new trainee academy.
4. Hire new PPO trainees in conjunction with commencing the dates for the new employee academy.
5. Reduce the time period it takes for new officers to be certified.
6. Obtain commitment from the DOC Training Division to schedule multiple new employee training academies to reduce the vacant PPO positions in DCC.
7. Develop a formalized mentoring program to assist newly appointed PPOs.
8. Ensure updated, current DCC policies, operational procedures, and curricula are fast tracked through the Training Commission in order to ensure that the newly appointed PPOs receive the latest policies and procedures in the new employee training academy.

9. Retrain all area divisional personnel specialist in merit system rules and regulations for recruitment and selection processes, with the goal of expanding the pool of eligible applicants.
10. Reduce the span of control and the areas of responsibility for DCC Central Administration. Currently, the span of control for DCC Central Administration is too large. A senior position to manage the administrative functions of the DCC would reduce the work burden on the Senior Administrator and the Director. This additional position would permit the Senior Administrator to focus on operational issues.
11. Reduce the span of control for the Area Administrator. Currently, the span of control for the Area Administrator is too large. Another position is recommended to have administrative responsibilities that would reduce the workload of the Area Administrator and the Assistant Area Administrator.
12. The Reviewers recommend that a training/coaching session for management staff be provided to assist with uniformity of application in the corrective action process.
13. The DCC should review its corrective action policies and processes, as well as consider the feasibility of delegating certain disciplinary actions at the Area Administrator level.
14. Reduce the CPPO span of control to 6 or 7 PPOs to 1 CPPO.
15. Reduce the Wake County CPPO span of control from 22 staff to 1 CPPO to function as an intake supervisor. This recommendation would require another supervisor be appointed to supervise the PPOs assigned to the Wake County Intake office.
16. Provide clerical assistance to each supervision team to support team operations and free PPOs from clerical functions, such as filing, copying, etc.
17. Conduct a state level staffing analysis to lend support for a lower span of control with the goals to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency.



## **Appendix: Interview Schedules**

All interviews with the Division of Community Corrections staff were held at the central administration offices of the Director.

The Stakeholder Meeting was held in the Wake County Sherriff's Office.

Interview with the Wake County Intake Office was held at the Wake County Intake Office.

Senior Administrator Glenn Mills was the principal contact who was briefed daily on the Reviewers activities. An exit meeting was held with Administrator Glenn on May 29, 2008.

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### **Tuesday, May 27, 2008**

#### **2pm – Wake County Stakeholder Meeting**

1. Maggie Brewer – CPPO – Wake County DCC
2. Lorrin Freeman – Clerk, Wake County Superior Court
3. Detective Jim Vinson – Raleigh Police – Chief's Office
4. Howard Cummings – Wake County District Attorney
5. Paul Gessner – Superior Court Judge
6. Richard Sampson – Lieutenant Wake County Sherriff, Warrant Squard
7. Richard Jenson – Chief of Operation, Wake County Sherriff's Office

#### **3:30pm**

1. CPPO Susan Copeland – Wake County Intake Office

### **Wednesday, May 28, 2008**

#### **9am – 11:30am**

1. James R. Fulwood, Administrator, Second Judicial District
2. J. David McDuffie, Assistant Administrator

#### **11:30am – 12:30pm**

1. Roselyn Powell, Administrator, Third Judicial District
2. Betty Bauer, Assistant Administrator

#### **1:30pm – 3:00pm Judicial District Managers (JDM)**

- |                    |                       |                      |              |
|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| 1. Jerry Jackson   | 2. Royster Washington | 3. Carea Bass        | 4. John Lee  |
| 5. Randy Hussey    | 6. Diane B. Issacs    | 7. Vernon Bryant     | 8. Bill Neal |
| 9. Max Gerald      | 10. Chris Oxendine    | 11. Cynthia Mitchell |              |
| 12. Cheryl Modelin |                       |                      |              |

**Wednesday, May 28, 2008**

3:00pm – 4:30pm – Chief Parole & Probation Officers

- |                      |                      |                 |                       |
|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Sharon L. Craven  | 2. Sharon L. Mardis  | 3. Scott Brewer | 4. Bobby Dickerson    |
| 5. Jonathan Wilson   | 6. Celeste Kelly     | 7. Ronda Powell | 8. Regina Ray         |
| 9. Jacqueline Murphy | 10. Carla Yarborough | 11. Lisha Pharr | 12. Kimberly Williams |
| 13. Terry Paige      | 14. Clifton Vaughn   |                 |                       |

**Thursday, May 29, 2008**

9am – 11:30am – Parole & Probation Officers

- |                      |                      |                    |                    |
|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Shawn Ingram      | 2. Avery McKeithen   | 3. Donna Blankney  | 4. Dusty Fleming   |
| 5. Karen Treadway    | 6. Paulette McDaniel | 7. Jean Clark      | 8. Will Sinclair   |
| 9. Jason Bensavage   | 10. Bobby Edwards    | 11. Lodie Ammons   | 12. Malia Snyder   |
| 13. DeShaunn Pollock | 14. Philip Rose      | 15. William Brewer | 16. Sarah Hall     |
| 17. Dennis Stocks    | 18. Tidas Johnson    | 19. Joy Doub       | 20. Joyce Marshall |
| 21. Megan S. Lyall   | 22. Alvin Breeder    | 23. Nancy Bennett  | 24. Nancy Monroe   |
| 25. Spencer Noble    |                      |                    |                    |

11:30am – 12:30pm – DCC Central Administration Staff

- |                     |                       |                  |                 |
|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Cynthia Williams | 2. Conrad Strader     | 3. Karen Buck    | 4. Jay Lynn     |
| 5. Carmen Mathieu   | 6. Hannah Rowland     | 7. Beth Thornton | 8. Vickie Adams |
| 9. Robin Gray       | 10. Brett Bartholomew |                  |                 |

1:30pm – 3:30pm – DCC Special Audit Team

- |                    |                    |                          |                      |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Vernon Bryan    | 2. Scott Idol      | 3. Diane Isaacs          | 4. Glorious Ellicott |
| 5. Allison Jsundar | 6. Danny Auman     | 7. Doris Coldlough-Hardy |                      |
| 8. Thurma Turner   | 9. Randy Hussey    | 10. Susan Walker         | 11. Lynn Wilson      |
| 12. David Calloway | 13. Cynthia Sutton | 14. John Lee             |                      |

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